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COGNITIVE ECONOMICS
By MILES KIMBALL
University of Michigan
Cognitive economics is the economics of what is in people’s minds. It is a vibrant area of
research (much of it within behavioural economics, labour economics and the economics
of education) that brings into play novel types of data, especially novel types of survey data.
Such data highlight the importance of heterogeneity across individuals and highlight
thorny issues for welfare economics. A key theme of cognitive economics is finite cogni-
tion (often misleadingly called “bounded rationality”), which poses theoretical challenges
that call for versatile approaches. Cognitive economics brings a rich toolbox to the task of
understanding a complex world.
1. Introduction
Names matter. In particular, naming subfields of economics can help economists to see
connections they otherwise might not have seen between their own research agenda and the
research agenda of other economists. A well-chosen name can foster esprit de corps within
a subfield and help in explaining the unifying ideas in that subfield to students. This paper
is an argument for the appropriateness of the name “cognitive economics” for a growing
subfield of economics, and for the importance of the research that has been done and can
be done in cognitive economics. It also discusses key themes in cognitive economics and
the issues they raise.
It is important to stress that (if the name I propose is deemed acceptable) research in
cognitive economics has already been underway for a long time. However, as a participant
in this subfield, it seems to me that research in this area has been growing in recent years.
I argue here that there are great opportunities for further research in cognitive economics.
Even the name “cognitive economics” is not altogether new, as performing a web search
of “cognitive economics” quickly shows. Notable in using this label are two 2004 edited
volumes: Paul Bourgine and Jean-Pierre Nadal’s Cognitive Economics: An Interdiscipli-
nary Approach and Massimo Egidi and Salvatore Rizzello’s two-volume Cognitive Eco-
nomics, both of which predate the earliest April 7, 2007 version of this paper by several
years. Although their views are not exactly the same as the one I give below, I consider the
way they use the term “cognitive economics” as broadly consistent with mine. However,
the label “cognitive economics” is still not in broad use. My hope is that this paper will
help in popularizing what I think is a very useful label, as well as foster the research that
it refers to.
Below, much of the discussion is about how cognitive economics relates to behavioural
economics (primarily as a subset of behavioural economics, although not entirely).
However, I also see a logical relationship between cognitive economics and human capital
theory. The development of economics in many topical areas often follows a progression
from treating a model element as a black box viewed from the outside to peering into the
mechanism inside the black box. In black box treatments, the cognitive and informational
nature of human capital and technology is pushed into the background. For human capital
and technology, looking deeply into the black box involves looking at what is going on
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inside human minds. Thus, I see cognitive economics as a logical extension and broadening
of human capital theory, including both those types of human capital that are acquired and
those types that one is born with.
2. Defining cognitive economics
Cognitive economics is defined as the economics of what is in people’s minds. In
practical terms, this means that cognitive economics is characterized by its use of a
distinctive kind of data. This includes data on expectations, hypothetical choices,
cognitive ability and expressed attitudes. Categorizing a field of economics by the type of
data used and theorized about makes some sense from a practical point of view because
working with a particular type of data often requires some specific human capital. A simple
typology of areas of economic research by type of data addressed would be something like
the following. (Note that each of these areas of economics is concerned with data on
naturally occurring market choices and time allocations as well as its distinctive type of
data.)
• Traditional economics: data on naturally occurring market choices and time allocations
only
• Experimental economics: data on choices in artificial situations with real stakes
• Field experiments
• Laboratory experiments
• Neuroeconomics: data from brain imaging and other ways of measuring brain activity,
data on eyeball orientation and data on other physiological measures, such as skin
conductance, muscle activation or hormone levels
• Genoeconomics: data on genes
• Cognitive economics: data on hypothetical choices, psychometric data, and self-report
data on mental contents
• Survey measures of expectations
• Survey measures of preference parameters
• Direct measures of intelligence
• Direct measures of decision-making skill
• Self-reported emotions, including self-reported happiness
• Survey measures of beliefs about how the world works.
There is some tension between the definition of cognitive economics as the economics
of what is in people’s minds and the practical delineation of cognitive economics as the use
of survey data to access what is in people’s minds in relation to economics. In particular,
experimental data and neuroeconomic data are also key ways of getting at what is in
people’s minds. To the extent only or mainly experimental data and neuroeconomic data
are used, those labels will serve just fine. However, I would class mixed approaches
using a heavy dose of survey data combined with some experimental data or some
neuroeconomics data as cognitive economics. As ways are found to reduce the cost of
experimental data and neuroeconomic data, such mixed approaches to cognitive economics
will become more and more important.
The name “cognitive economics” is coined by analogy to “cognitive psychology”, the
area of psychology that examines internal mental processes such as problem solving,
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memory and language. Historically, cognitive psychology was a departure from the behav-
iourism of Ivan Pavlov, Leonard Bloomfield and B. F Skinner, which insisted that only
outward behaviour was a legitimate subject of study. Similarly, cognitive economics is a
departure from the tradition in economics that only outward behaviour is a fit subject of
study for economics: a tradition that was fostered by Vilfredo Pareto, Paul Samuelson and
Milton Friedman (1912–2006), among others, and was still strong when I attended gradu-
ate school in the mid-1980s.1
The name “cognitive economics” might initially sound as if it is yet another synonym for
behavioural economics (which might have been better named psychological economics).
However, although there will be overlap, I mean something different. The most obvious
difference is that cognitive economics is narrower. Behavioural economics addresses a
huge range of issues and cuts across all of the data types listed above, while cognitive
economics focuses primarily on innovative kinds of survey data, along with laboratory data
of the same basic type. To say the same thing in a more pointed way, behavioural economics
is so big, it is very difficult to keep up with all of the developments within behavioural
economics. Cognitive economics has a more manageable size.
Second, important pieces of cognitive economics are inspired by the internal dynamic of
economics rather than by psychology. As examples, in addition to the interest in intelli-
gence measures that arose out of human capital theory, the importance of expectations and
preference parameters in macroeconomics has spurred a desire for direct measurement of
expectations and preference parameters.
Third, I think it is fair to say that behavioural economics has been to an important degree
a school of thought as well as an area of study. In coming up with a definition of cognitive
economics, I want to indicate an area of study, not a particular viewpoint. To make this
point clear, a research agenda arguing that, in fact, data on mental contents and hypotheti-
cal choices was unreliable would be part of cognitive economics. Indeed, at the more
constructive end of doubting data on mental contents and psychological data, in my view
it is hard to take empirical work on data on mental contents or hypothetical choices
seriously unless the statistical modelling includes a response error term. Kimball et al.
(2008) give a basic example of such modelling. Moreover, when studying more than one
type of question within a survey wave, it is typically important to allow also for correlations
across different response errors within a survey wave.
Finally, there is a slice of behavioural economics that explicitly excludes the mind:
notably the “mindless economics” that Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2008) advo-
cate, in which empirical data suggesting nonstandard outward behaviour is studied from a
purely axiomatic point of view. (There is a fair amount of microeconomic theory done in
a way consistent with this view, although often by economists who themselves are also
comfortable with a more mindful approach.)
In addition to the overlap between cognitive economics and behavioural economics,
there is an obvious complementarity between cognitive economics and behavioural eco-
nomics. Although it is possible to consider nonstandard theories of human behaviour on the
basis of standard data on market decisions alone, freeing up economic theory from
traditional assumptions tends to increase the number of free parameters. There is a great
value to additional data that can help pin down these additional free parameters. Standard
data on market decisions do not always provide power for decisive tests of new theories.
1 For this history, see the discussion in Franz Dietrich and Christian List (2012).
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Looking at the complementarity from the other direction, even an approach to new
kinds of data that begins by attempting to measure standard economic concepts such as
expectations and preferences with the hope that these concepts obey the standard assump-
tions is likely to find at least some areas where the standard assumptions seem to be
violated. Here, behavioural (psychological) economics can help provide alternative theo-
ries to be tested.
Before moving on, let me make the practical delineation of cognitive economics by its
heavy use of novel types of survey data more vivid by giving a few specific examples.
1 Intelligence tests are used in one way when intelligence tests are seen as one input into
earning ability. However, quiz questions can also be used to see if people understand
what they would need to understand to make economic decisions in the way specified in
standard economic models. The University of Michigan’s Cognitive Economics Survey
and RAND’s American Life Panel both have extensive batteries of questions measuring
financial sophistication, and many other surveys have basic financial literacy questions.
Analysing such data can be very sobering for economists used to assuming very high
levels of competence on the part of the agents in their models.
2 Survey measurement of expectations at the individual level has a long and distinguished
history. For example, many macroeconomists, including many macroeconomists in
central banks, take survey measures of inflation expectations seriously. The University
of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers, the University of Michigan’s Health and Retire-
ment Study and RAND’s American Life Panel have many other types of expectations
data: for example, personal mortality expectations and stock market return expecta-
tions. Techniques for dealing with expectations data have become quite sophisticated.
See, for example, Jeffrey Dominitz and Charles Manski (2011) and Hudomiet et al.
(2011).
3 If one is willing to give some credence to hypothetical choices, it is possible to design
survey measures of a wide range of preference parameters. The University of Michigan’s
Health and Retirement Study has hypothetical choice measures of risk aversion, time
preference and intertemporal substitution, the income elasticity of labour supply, and
altruism. However, in principle, almost any type of preference parameter can be assessed
by hypothetical choice questions. Internal consistency checks (including estimation of
the size of response error variance) can often be devised to help identify the practical
boundary of what can be measured at this point in the development of technique. (For
example, it turns out that measuring the marginal propensity to consume is very difficult.
The approach pioneered by Matthew Shapiro and Joel Slemrod and continued with
Claudia Sahm had to make many compromises. See Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and
Sahm et al. (2012).)
4 There is now a vast literature in economics using self-reported happiness or other
subjective well-being measures such as life satisfaction, or one’s rank on a ladder of life.
The recent push to develop national well-being measures, and doubts about the com-
prehensiveness of any one survey question on well-being, have led to a more and more
multidimensional approach to measuring subjective well-being. That in turn has led to
efforts to combine the measurement of a vector of levels of subjective well-being with
hypothetical choice data on how individuals would trade off different dimensions of
well-being. See Benjamin et al. (2014b).
5 Data on the personality psychologists’ big five personality traits (openness to experience,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism) are available on many
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surveys. (For example, the University of Michigan’s Health and Retirement Study has
questions to assess the big five on its psychosocial leave-behind: a pencil and paper
survey left behind after in-person interviews.) However, other traits may be just as
important. Almlund et al. (2011) give a useful survey of some of the results that have
been found.
Having defined the field of cognitive economics in what is hopefully a fairly neutral way,
let me give my opinion on existing research and future directions in cognitive economics,
organized around three themes: using data on hypothetical choices and mental contents: (i)
to identify individual heterogeneity; (ii) to revisit welfare economics; and (iii) to study
finite cognition. Data on hypothetical choices and what is in people’s minds has obvious
relevance to these three themes. Finite cognition also raises some important theoretical
issues that I will discuss.
3. Identifying individual heterogeneity
Heterogeneity across individuals in preferences and cognitive ability is not at all
controversial. However, data limitations have often forced economists to assume uni-
formity. Here the kind of data discussed above can do a lot to allow economists to
capture some of the heterogeneity that exists. In addition to mattering in obvious ways
for empirical work, direct data on preference heterogeneity across individuals can
inspire theory with a greater emphasis on heterogeneity. For example, Kimball et al.
(2015b) use estimates of the distribution of risk tolerance from hypothetical choice data
in the Health and Retirement Study to calibrate a model of “portfolio rebalancing in
general equilibrium”.
4. Revisiting welfare economics
Concern with policy and overall welfare motivates some of the concern with measuring
preference parameters that I discussed above in the context of identifying individual
heterogeneity. In particular, the population distributions of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, labour supply elasticities and interpersonal dependencies in preferences have
important implications for the welfare effects of capital and labour taxation. In addition to
data on preferences based on hypothetical choices, there has been considerable interest in
using data on self-reported happiness to study welfare issues.
The use of self-reported happiness to study welfare issues illustrates a key methodo-
logical issue in cognitive economics. Whenever a new measure is used, its rela-
tionship to standard concepts of economic theory is at issue. For example, welfare
economics is based on preferences, with the objective of getting people as much
as possible of what they want. Thus, in order to use self-reported happiness to
address welfare issues, it is crucial to establish the relationship between self-reported
happiness and preferences. The most common assumption in the economics
literature using self-reported happiness has been that self-reported happiness is equal
to some version of utility. If self-reported happiness were, in fact, tightly linked
to preferences in this way, that would be of enormous importance for welfare
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economics.2 Kimball and Willis (2006) argue at length that self-reported happiness does
not behave like utility, but has a more complex relationship to utility. Benjamin et al.
(2012, 2014a, 2014b) back up this view.
It is possible, however, that happiness data could have a tight relationship to preferences
even if the level of happiness does not. In particular, to explain the data, Kimball and Willis
(2006) suggest that a large component of self-reported happiness depends on recent
innovations in lifetime utility. Whenever people receive good news about lifetime utility,
self-reported happiness temporarily spikes; whenever people receive bad news about
lifetime utility, self-reported happiness temporarily dips. If true, this means that while it is
questionable to use the level of happiness to infer preferences, the dynamics of happiness
are informative about preferences and so can be used to inform welfare economics. Like
the empirically doubtful assumption that the level of happiness has a tight relationship to
utility, a tight relationship between the impulse response of happiness to news and the size
of innovations to lifetime utility would have great practical value for economists in areas
where market choices are not fully informative about preferences. Even if such an assump-
tion is only approximately true, it would mean that the dynamics of happiness could be
used to study interpersonal dependencies in the utility function, preferences over events
largely outside of one’s control, such as the death of one’s spouse, and preferences over
nonfinancial aspects of public policy. Work on this hypothesis is still in its infancy. Kimball
et al. (2006) and Kimball et al. (2015a) are examples of work in this area. (Here it is
important to distinguish between focusing on the short-run dynamics of happiness as
informative and studying the long-run changes once the dynamics have settled down, as in,
say, Ishino et al. (2012).)
5. Studying finite cognition
Taking a simplified view of information as recorded data and data summaries, for the
purposes of this paper I will call all of the other operations of the human mind besides the
bare recording and accessing of information “cognition”, without the finer distinctions that
psychologists often focus on. Moreover, to avoid the judgment Herbert Simon’s phrase
“bounded rationality” can inadvertently suggest, I will refer instead to “finite cognition”.3
Finite cognition means something more than just imperfect information: it means finite
intelligence, imperfect information processing, and decision-making that is costly. Finite
cognition is the third key theme I see for cognitive economics.
2 Layard (2005) explicitly makes some of the policy recommendations that would flow from assuming that
self-reported happiness directly indicates true preferences. It is sometimes hard to distinguish the view that
self-reported happiness is equal to a version of utility in the economist’s sense of utility from a view
common among psychologists studying happiness (following Kahneman, 1999) that self-reported happi-
ness is distinct from preferences, but that as a matter of public policy we should maximize the present
discounted value of self-reported happiness rather than give people what they prefer.
3 Often, the inadvertent judgment suggested by “bounded rationality” is quite inappropriate. For example,
if decision-making is actually costly, which is more “rational”, to choose in a way that takes into account
the costliness of decision-making or to pretend that decision-making has zero cost? If one’s intelligence
is actually finite, which is more rational, taking into account the limits on one’s intelligence, or pretending
that one’s thinking power is unlimited? There is certainly a sense in which knowing and adjusting to one’s
own limitations can often be the height of “rationality”.
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If true, explanations based on finite cognition have enormous practical consequences
and policy implications. In particular, finite cognition implies that even in the absence of
externalities, welfare can often be improved by economic education, setting up appro-
priate default choices for people, or providing disinterested, credible advice. By contrast,
explanations of puzzling behaviour on the basis of individuals maximizing exotic pref-
erences imply (if true) that welfare improvements must come in the standard way from
addressing externalities, or in the case of inconsistent preferences, by taking sides in an
internal conflict. Once puzzling behaviour that is difficult to explain on the basis of
standard economic theory is identified, it is hard to think of a more important question
than whether people behave that way because they want to, or simply because they are
confused.
My perspective on finite cognition is close to that of the excellent discussion by Conlisk
(1996). I will limit myself to highlighting a few of what I consider the most salient points,
with my own spin.
5.1 The reality of finite and scarce cognition
The first key point is the reality of finite cognition. Although the inadequacies of our
current tools can make it hard to study finite cognition theoretically, the claim that
human intelligence is finite and that finite intelligence matters for economic life (scarce
cognition) is not really controversial.4 Even those economists whose opinion of their own
intelligence is unreasonably exalted are regularly reminded by what they see in students
and coworkers that not everyone has unlimited intelligence. Many people pay substantial
sums for financial advice even aside from commissions on transactions. Even those who
have low wage rates, so that their time is less expensive, often pay others to do their tax
returns. As for lawyers, even if one considers talking in a courtroom a special skill that
is not just a matter of intelligence, people pay a lot of money to lawyers who merely read
law books and extract the relevant information. If everyone had infinite intelligence, it
would be easy to understand the law books on one’s own, and paying someone else to
do it would only make sense if one’s wage rate was higher than the lawyer’s wage rate,
or if one was a slow reader for physiological reasons. If everyone had infinite intelli-
gence, even finite reading speeds would not give trained lawyers enough of an edge for
them to charge the fees they do.
One of the most important economic manifestations of finite intelligence is the expen-
sive and time-consuming acquisition of human capital. Most obviously, the large amount of
resources devoted to mathematical education and research would make little economic
sense in a world in which everyone had infinite cognition. Mathematicians spend their
entire careers discovering and teaching things with very little informational content about
the external world: things that would be easily deducible by anyone with infinite
4 There are many problems that are too hard for even those with very high levels of intelligence. For
example, one of the problems with Bayesian updating is that, strictly speaking, it involves putting a positive
probability on a much greater than astronomically huge set of possibilities. Various strategies of econo-
mizing on information processing are always essential in practice. Even the existence of a utility function
itself is, in a sense, a technique of economizing on information transfer and processing. If evolution could
process an infinite amount of information, and the genetic code could transmit an infinite amount of
information, we could be endowed with decision rules embracing essentially all contingencies instead of
mere objective functions and calculation capabilities.
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intelligence. In other subject areas, education may involve a significant amount of straight-
forward information transfer. However, in most areas, the acquisition of useful habits of
thought is at least as important.5 Teaching students to “think like an economist” is itself
somewhere between information transfer and the inculcation of some of those useful habits
of thought. Below I present a model of the effects of being taught a standard model of
portfolio choice. This is an area where I think many individuals are confused and where
making the right choices is important. This model of misunderstanding is relatively simple,
but breaks some of the normal theoretical taboos. The remainder of this section makes the
case for why it is sometimes necessary to break those taboos.
5.2 Difficulties in studying finite cognition with standard theoretical tools
One key reason it is not easy using our standard theoretical tools to model finite cognition
is the “infinite regress” problem emphasized by John Conlisk (1996). The infinite regress
problem afflicts models that assume a cost of computation or other decision-making cost.
The problem is that figuring out how much time to spend in making a decision is almost
always a strictly harder decision than the original decision. In particular, one would
typically need to know the right choice to the original decision to calculate the value of
making additional computations to make the right choice instead of another choice. Given
costly decision-making, the agent faces a serious issue of figuring out whether it is worth
thinking carefully about the original problem, which leads to the issue of figuring out
whether it is worth thinking carefully about thinking carefully about the original problem,
and so on.
Costs to decision-making are a natural enough assumption for economists that a sub-
stantial percentage of all applied economic theory papers might include them, if it were
not for the infinite regress problem. Finessing the infinite regress problem somehow is
essential if economists are to develop effective theoretical tools for studying finite cog-
nition. There are several feasible strategies for getting around the infinite regress problem:
every one of which requires breaking at least one inhibition shared by many economists.
Least transgressive are models in which an agent sits down once in a long while to think
very carefully about how carefully to think about decisions of a frequently encountered
type. For example, it is not impossible that someone might spend one afternoon consid-
ering how much time to spend on each of many grocery-shopping trips in comparison
shopping. In this type of modelling, the infrequent computations of how carefully to think
about repeated types of decisions could be approximated as if there were no computa-
tional cost, even though the context of the problem implies that those computational costs
are strictly positive.
A second strategy is to give up on modelling finite cognition directly and use models
of limited information transmission capacity as a way of getting agents to make more
5 This becomes clear when one thinks of what education that was straightforward Bayesian updating of
information would look like. After diligent information acquisition in elementary and secondary school,
students would arrive at college with a mental checklist of blanks to be filled in as “true” or “false” and
parameter values (including probabilities) to be adjusted according to each new piece of data encoun-
tered. Education as straightforward Bayesian updating would not involve any true insights: only partial
confirmations and disconfirmations of things students saw as at least dim possibilities from the very
beginning.
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imperfect decisions. In other words, one can accept the fact that our standard tools require
constrained optimization with its implication of infinite intelligence somewhere in the
model, but handicap agents in the model by giving them a “thick skull” that is very
inefficient at transmitting information to the infinitely intelligent decision-maker within
(i.e. the perfect constrained optimizer within). This is a way to interpret the program of
Christopher Sims (2002) that disconnects the implied transmission bit-rates from
anything in the external world because low bit-rates would only be a metaphor for finite
cognition.6
A third feasible strategy is in the spirit of what the complexity theorists call
“agent-based modelling”.7 This typically involves modelling agents with very limited
intelligence, such as finite-state automata. One of the findings is that such very
limited agents can still handle some kinds of decisions surprisingly well. Many other
modelling techniques such as adaptive expectations or simple rules of thumb similarly
endow the agents in models with unrealistically subhuman intelligence. This type of
modelling substitutes the problem of agents that have unrealistically subhuman intelli-
gence for the problem we have been focusing on of agents that have unrealistically
superhuman intelligence. Despite this lack of realism, the results can be very instruc-
tive because the failure of realism is in the opposite direction from what economists are
used to.
In this paper, I would like to focus on a fourth strategy for getting around the infinite
regress problem, one that seems to me less commonly used: modelling economic actors as
doing constrained optimization in relation to a simpler economic model than the model
treated as true in the analysis. This simpler economic model treated as true by the agent can
be called a “folk theory”.8
A folk theory should not be confused with the folk theorem of repeated game theory. We
are talking about folk economics in the same sense as the well established ideas of “folk
psychology”, “folk physics” and “folk biology” (all of which are worth looking up on
Wikipedia).
My example of a folk theory model will be a partially uninformed household that
solves a portfolio choice problem as if the objective function were additively separ-
able in the outcomes for the various securities making up the portfolio. The justifi-
cation for such a modelling approach is the idea that it is possible for economic actors
to be aware of a simple economic theory, but unaware of more sophisticated economics.
This lack of awareness makes them act in their own eyes as if the simpler theory
were true.
6 Sticky information of various sorts has become an important topic area in macroeconomics. Michael
Woodford (2002) follows the Sims approach directly. A substantial literature stimulated by Greg Mankiw
and Ricardo Reis (2002) models sticky information as agents who only periodically incorporate new
external information into their inner information sets.
7 Agent-based modelling is a big emphasis of Bourgine and Nadal (2004). See also the review by Wilcox
(2005a).
8 Although the relevant chapters do not treat subjective views as formal folk theories, the theme of
subjectivity is important in the Austrian and Hayekian economics emphasized in Egidi and Rizzello
(2004), a pair of edited volumes with the title Cognitive Economics. The work of Karl Polanyi, with its
emphasis on tacit knowledge, is also highlighted. A folk theory can be tacit, rather than fully expressed by
agents in words. See also the review by Wilcox (2005b).
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5.3 Modelling unawareness requires a subjective state space for the
economic actor distinct from the true state space9
The idea of someone being unaware of an idea, while intuitive, has more radical theoretical
implications than one might at first suspect. These implications are encapsulated in the title
of an important paper by Dekel et al. (1998): “Standard State-Space Models Preclude
Unawareness”.10 Dekel et al. (1998, p. 164) say the following about two “properties of
knowledge [that] are usually assumed, but will prove problematic for an agent who is
unaware of something”:
Necessitation is the assumption that the agent “knows all tautologies.” This name comes from
the philosophy literature. Monotonicity says that if E implies F, then knowledge of E implies
knowledge of F.
The reader should suspect that there will be problems with making these assumptions hold
in a model where the agent is unaware of some possibilities. Both seem to require the agent to
have a certain understanding of the state space which seems questionable when the agent is
unaware of something.
Later on, Dekel et al. (1998, p. 170) argue for relaxing what they call the “real states”
assumption as follows:
In standard state-space models, states play two distinct roles: they are the analyst’s descriptions
of ways the world might be and they are also the agent’s descriptions of ways the world might
be. If the agent is unaware of some possibility, though, ‘his’ states should be less complete than
the analyst’s. In particular, the propositions the agent is unaware of should not ‘appear in’ the
states he perceives.
This description of the real states assumption is very close to what the stricture
of “rational expectations” has meant in practice within macroeconomics: what-
ever model the analyst is using, the agent also has that model in his or her
9 The proof of this statement in Dekel et al. (1998) involves assuming event sufficiency (the very useful
assumption that if two propositions are true on the same subset of a state space, the agent is aware of one
if and only if he or she is aware of the other), plausibility (unawareness implies not knowing and not
knowing that one doesn’t know), KU introspection (one never knows one is unaware of a particular event),
AU introspection (being aware of the possibility of being unaware of a specific event implies being aware
of the possibility of that event) and weak necessitation (being aware of a proposition implies being aware
of “obvious” tautologies involving that proposition, such as the statement that the proposition implies
itself).
10 My attempt to translate the formal mathematical argument for why “standard state space models preclude
unawareness” into words (although admittedly not into normal English) goes as follows. Because of the
fundamental meaning of “unawareness”, for any event, it is a contradiction to know that you are unaware
of that event, because that knowledge of unawareness would make you aware of the possibility of the
event. If you know the state space (as several different tempting assumptions imply you would), you know
the things that are always true in the state space, including this basic logic. That is, you know that you will
never know that you are unaware of a particular event. However, knowing that you don’t know something
implies that you are aware of the possibility of that thing. In particular, knowing that you will never know
that you are unaware of a particular event means you must be aware of the possibility of being unaware
of that particular event, but being aware of the possibility of being unaware of something implies that you
are aware of that thing. In particular, being aware of the possibility of being unaware of a particular event
implies that you must be aware of the possibility of that particular event. Because this argument works
for any event, if you know the state space, you must be aware of the possibility of every event in that
state space.
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mind.11 Departures from the real states assumption would allow agents to have a different
model of the economic situation in their minds than the maintained assumptions the analyst
is using to model the situation of those very agents.12 For example, the agents might have
in mind an outdated model of the economic situation that appeared in a highly respected
economics article from years gone by, while the analyst takes a more sophisticated model
as the maintained assumption. In this case, to say that it is ridiculous for the agents to have
in mind an outdated economic model would be to claim that it was unreasonable for
anyone, esteemed predecessor or not, to ever have entertained the outdated model.
For example, think of a high school senior deciding whether or not to go to college.13
Suppose going to college will reduce computation costs that aid in future economic
decision-making. Full-scale calculation of the value of this reduction in economic
decision-making costs would involve knowing what the optimal decisions are for many
choices in the future, as well as the likely faulty decisions given higher decision-making
costs. However, the high school senior need not be modelled as approaching this problem
as a full-scale Bayesian optimizer. Instead, the high-school senior might be modelled as
having in mind a simple black-box model of human capital similar to Becker’s original
human capital model, with some very rough expectations about what the value of the
benefits of education are.14
Note that if someone is successfully taught a more sophisticated model, this would
involve an expansion in the individual’s subjective state space. If positive probabilities
were accorded to the newly added states, this must necessarily involve a departure from
Bayesian updating.
Presumably it is also possible for people to “see the light” even without being explicitly
taught. For example, the agent might be driven to entertain an expanded model if the
probability of observed events conditional on the initial folk model ever appeared suffi-
ciently low.15 We all recognize the practical importance of expansions in one’s subjective
state space when in scientific contexts we say “Asking the right question is half the battle”.
11 For perspective on expectations, it is useful to read early discussions of expectations in economics, such
as Shackle (1949).
12 Because the economic theorist would then know more about the fundamental situation than the agent the
theorist is modelling, a departure from the real states assumption could be in the opposite direction from
the common econometric assumption that the agents know more than the econometrician. Of course, both
gaps can occur: the analyst could know more of the basic structure of the situation, while the agent knows
certain parameters better.
13 Finite cognition is an unavoidable issue when making decisions about one’s own education. See Kimball
(2013) and Kimball and Smith (2013).
14 One practical implication for economists of such a failure of full-scale rational expectations is that
expectations must be measured rather than deduced. Given the fact that the high school senior cannot
really calculate the true value of the benefits of education, there is no reason to assume that these
expectations will be tightly anchored to the true value, so empirical implementation of such a model
should ideally include an attempt to directly measure the expectations of high school seniors.
15 That is, if one is willing to depart from Bayesian updating, the reliance of an agent on a simple model S
need not imply that the agent will react with denial to overwhelming evidence against S. However, if the
only way one is willing to describe an agent’s reliance on the simple model S is to say that the agent puts
a zero prior probability on anything outside of S, then one is forced to predict that the agent will react with
denial even to overwhelming evidence against S. More commonly, to avoid the implication of heedless
denial, the agent is implicitly assumed to have a strictly positive prior probability on a huge range of
possibilities, so that whatever the analyst thinks is the truth is sure to be included as something the agent
thinks is possible.
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5.4 Using folk theories to model finite cognition: A portfolio choice example
Ultimately, the choice among folk theories in a folk theory model must be based on direct
evidence about how people view the world. However, to design questions to determine how
people view the relevant aspects of the world, it is important to develop formal candidate
folk theories, just as it is important to develop the theories that we as analysts treat as our
best approximation to the truth.
The definition of a folk theory in this context is simply any theory that one or more
agents in the model hold, other than the theory the analyst is taking as the maintained
hypothesis. Clearly, the desirable properties for a modelled folk theory are quite different
from the desirable properties for a theory proposed as a good approximation of reality. A
folk theory need not be logically consistent at a deep level. Indeed, in representing reality,
it may be a positive virtue for a folk theory to have logical inconsistencies of a form
similar to the logical inconsistencies real people might have in their views of the world.
Other than (a) descriptive accuracy as a reasonable representation of how people actually
view the world, for theoretical purposes the key desirable properties for a modelled folk
theory are (b) providing a clear prediction for how the people holding that folk theory
will behave in various circumstances and (c) representing clearly what the people holding
the folk theory are confused about and what they do understand. In terms discussed in
Richard Herrnstein (1997), particular in the chapters with Drazen Prelec, a folk theory
should at least implicitly model the accounting framework that an agent uses, in addition
to the objective function.
Because it need not be logically consistent at a deep level, the argument for a folk
theory can involve (correct reasoning about) logical leaps and plausible, though fallacious
reasoning. In my model of a folk theory of portfolio choice, I propose that people have
heard that: (i) high mean return is good; (iii) risk is bad; and (iii) diversification is good.
Diversification being good might be represented by a maxim such as “Don’t put all of
your eggs in one basket”. In order to provide a clear prediction for what people will do,
I will model portfolio choice as a maximization problem, but a maximization problem
using an ill-founded indirect utility function. Indeed, I intend the maximization problem
to be the kind of thing a bad economist who did not know the literature might come up
with to represent the three ideas: (i) high mean return is good; (ii) risk is bad; and (iii)
diversification is good.
The agent is assumed to face (or to believe he or she faces) a no short-sales constraint
and solves
max ,
s
s
i i i i
ii
i
i
s s
≥
=∑
−( ) −( )∑
0
1
2 22 2μ γσ θ
where si is the share of each asset i in the agent’s financial portfolio, μi is the mean real
return, γ is risk aversion, σ i2 is the variance of the real return of asset i and θ is the
diversification parameter. (A plausible variant of this folk theory would use the mean and
variance of the nominal return.)
There are several things worth pointing out about this folk theory. First, for this
agent, the concept of diversification is not well connected to the risk considerations that
better theories link it to. Indeed, tendency toward diversification has its own separate
parameter, θ. Some agents could have high risk aversion but no motivation towards
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diversification, while others have a strong motivation to diversify (but still without much
understanding) corresponding to a high θ. Second, other than the overall constraint that
shares must add up to 1, each asset is treated separately. The agent has no understanding
of hedging. What is worse from a welfare point of view, the agent has no understanding
that diversification reduces risk enough that it is relatively safe to hold a large amount of
risky assets overall. The agent will be helped if some of the assets indexed by i are
actually mutual funds. However, in this case, the agent may “diversify” by choosing
several mutual funds of the same type. Much more could be said, but this gives some
idea of the kinds of “puzzles” this folk theory could help to explain. (However, I don’t
intend this folk theory model to be taken that seriously, but only to illustrate what I mean
by a “folk theory model”.)
Consider now what an agent would gain and lose by being taught a still grossly
inadequate, but to economists somewhat more familiar type of indirect utility function,
leading to
max .
s
s
i i
i
i i
ii
i
i
s s
≥
=∑
−∑ ∑
0
1
2 2μ γ σ
Although this second folk theory ignores all covariances between assets, it does convey the
idea that diversification allows one to safely hold a relatively large amount of risky assets,
because it multiplies the variances of returns by the squared shares. Indeed, this folk theory
would tend to overstate this benefit of diversification, because positive covariances apply
between most pairs of assets.
A third folk theory would get much closer to how economists usually think:
max ,
s
s
i
s s s
≥
=∑
′ − ′
0
1
μ γ Ω
where s is the vector of asset shares, μ is the vector of mean returns and Ω is the
variance–covariance matrix of returns. Note that even this folk theory omits many impor-
tant things. For example, it omits integration of human capital into the portfolio, and the
implication of this integration that many people who have small amounts of financial
wealth but large amounts of human capital uncorrelated with the market should have all of
their wealth in a leveraged, diversified market fund. It also omits subtle implications of an
intertemporal model, such as the understanding that many of the apparent financial risks of
fluctuations in the long-term real interest rate are cancelled out by the corresponding shifts
in the price of purchasing a given stream of future consumption. The understanding this
third folk theory brings of covariances comes at the considerable cost of either needing to
understand vector and matrix notation, or being able to deal with the messy algebra that
would be revealed using scalar notation.
In reality, I am confident that people’s thinking about portfolio choice varies from person
to person with a wild profusion of different kinds of misunderstanding. In most other
contexts as well, at least where there is some complexity, any model that assumes every-
one’s folk theory is of the same type is likely to be false. Realizing that people do not
always have the same mental model of a situation as the economist studying that situation
is the first step toward facing the motley truth about people’s folk theories.
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6. Conclusion
Economic research using more and more direct data about what is in people’s minds is
flourishing. However, much more can be done. Fostering continued progress in this area of
cognitive economics calls for three inputs. First, new theoretical tools for dealing with
finite cognition need to be developed, and existing theoretical tools sharpened. Second,
welfare economics needs to be toughened up for the rugged landscape revealed by peering
into people’s minds. Third, the statement “The data are endogenous” needs to become not
only an econometrician’s warning but also a motto reminding economists that new surveys
can be designed and new data of many kinds can be collected to answer pressing questions.
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